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Louise Cainkar

ISLAMIC REVIVAL AMONG
SECOND-GENERA TION ARAB-AMERICAN
MUSLIMS: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE AND
GLOBALIZATION INTERSECT

This article examines the chain of events that facilitated an Islamic revival
among second-generation Arab-American Muslims. Based upon research in
metropolitan Chicago, it argues against trends in the literature that describe
Western-born Muslims as foreigners, immigrants or, worse, anti-Western.
Similarly, it argues against setting their religious experiences solely in a domes
tic context. The article begins by documenting the lack of religious institutions
and practices among immigrant Arab Muslims before the 1990s and the limited
religious socialization of their American-born children. These conditions
emerged in part from secular trends in the immigrants' homelands. By the
1990s, a period of global Islamic revival, both immigrant and second-generation
Arab Muslims found practiced Islam attractive, particularly its capacity to pro
vide meaning and resilience for their own experiences in America. Individual
decisions to embrace Islam as more than a fact of birth were facilitated by devel
opments resulting from globalization and the creation of American Islamic
institutions, yet were, at the same time, intensely personal choices rooted in
local experiences. Although Islamic revival is global, its conduits should not be
viewed as causal. The article engages findings by Yang and Ebaugh (2001) and
Hirschman (2003), arguing that analyses of religiosity in the United States
must take into account historical contexts. Religiosity is an intensely personal
experience that must be explained at the intersection of the individual, the local
and the global.
IsLAMIC REVIVAL IS A CDMPLEX historical process with individual, national,
national and global components. Whether described as religious
resurgence, the rise of fundamentalist interpretations of the Qutan, a
trans

return to theological foundations, or a political movement with religion
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at its core, Islamic revival should be studied at both macro and micro
levels in each society in which it has taken place in order to determine
its universal and particular elements.1 Since structural processes in
themselves do not explain situat e d individual behaviour, micro level
studies help us to understand Islamic revival's local roots and appeal.
That is, they help us to understand why individuals choose to be religious
and, in the case highlighted by this article, why so many American-born
Muslims are more religiOUS than their immigrant parents.
(n this paper, ( look at the historical, local and global events that have set
the stage for Islamic revival among second-generation Arab-American
Muslims. Metropolitan Chicago is the site of empirically-grounded
research placing the specific contributions of migration, transnational
relationships and global Islamic revival in the context of a particular
Arab--American Muslim experience. At the micro level, Islamic revival is
defined as observable and measurable increases in the number of indi
vidual Muslims who engage in religious practices (such as praying, fast
ing and knowledge-seeking) and whose daily lives are informed by core
beliefs about faith in God (spirituality) and Islamic philosophies. I argue
that Islamic revival among second-generation Arab-American Muslims,
a population often referred to as 'immigrants' in the literature on Mus
lims in the West (although they are not), is an outcome of a complex
series of historically-grounded events that offered Islam as a powerful
tool providing meaning and resilience for the experience of growing up
as a Muslim and an Arab in the United States.
Standing at the intersection of history and biography (Mills 2000), this
examination of Islamic revival shows that an individual's decision to
embrace Islam as more than a fact of birth has been facilitated by devel
opments resulting from globalization, yet was, at the same time, an
intensely personal choice rooted in local experiences. In this article, I set
the stage for ongOing oral history research on Islamic revival among
second-generation Muslims in the United States and offer a new per
spective on the phenomenon.2

Uterature review
In the social science literature, Islamic revival is usually discussed as a
process particular to Muslim countries (see, for example, Berger and
Hefner 2003). It is frequently noted for its appeal to the socially, politi
cally and economically excluded. These assertions have led to widely
accepted notions that the spread of Islam as a potent ideology is
inherently related to political and socio-economic conditions in develop
ing nations. Said Arjomand (2003) has described Islamic revival as an
outcome of urbanization, modernization and increased literacy in the
Muslim world. He explains its expansion from the Muslim core as one
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result of globalization-via migration, mass communications and ease of
travel (to Mecca and other locales in that core). Arjomand takes issue
with Benjamin Barber's (1995) narrow characterization of Islamic
revival-and Islam itself-as inherently anti-Western and hostile, not
ing, however, that this perspective is held by many political commenta
tors and journalists.
The assumption that Muslim countries are central to the process of
Islamic revival carries over to social scientific analyses of Islam in the
West, where the message and the messengers of Islamic revival are usu
ally described as both foreign and anti-Western. Islamic revival in Europe
is explained as a phenomenon rooted in immigrants and migration (that
is, foreigners). Giles Kepel (2003,85), for example, states that "in order to
understand the forms that Islamic identity takes in Britain, it is first nec
essary to look closely at the most noteworthy elements of the history
which the immigrants brought with them" (my emphasis). Similarly, his
analysis of Islamic revival in France begins with a discussion of the
Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria. Masanori Naito's book (19%) on
the Islamic awakening in Europe similarly focuses upon immigrants. His
interpretation of the unfolding of Islamic revival renders a more accurate
picture at the micro level than Kepel's, but one which still counterpoises
Islam and Western culture. While Naito importantly anchors Islamic
revival in local experiences, he decontextualizes it, thereby missing the
link between global events and local outcomes, in other words, between
history and biography. Furthermore, he explains the Islamic identity of
the second generation as a product of their parents' religiosity and their
upbringing.
During the first decade of immigration, the Muslim immi grant s had lit
tle motivation for religious activities, they just earned money, saved,
and sent it to their families in the mother countries. Since they have set
tled with their families in the mid 1970s, Islam has revitalized as the
norm and value of their life, for they were afraid that infiltration of the
European life style and behavior into the Muslim youth would seriously
damage the unity of family which is the most precious value for the
Muslim. In addition, racial, ethnic and cultural discrimination also accel
erate to build a wall between host and immigrant society. Thus, Islam
became the strongest ties of the Muslim immigrants, and it built

stronger and broader networks among immigrants than ethnic ties
(Naito 1996; my emphasis).

These types of analyses overstress the fo reignness of the children of
immigrants. Considered members of an 'immigrant society,' they are
portrayed as cultural aliens (or, worse, enemy aliens) in the countries into
which they have been born. A tautological argument then often follows:
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Islam appeals to the second generation because they are essentially for
eign (not French, or German, or American).Their essential foreignness is
proven by their Islamic identity and practice.Having explained away a
complex sociological process by reductionism, analytic discussion
qUickly turns to the institutional level: mosques, organizations, leaders,
fundamentalism, militants, and/or political Islam, the most visible parts
of the puzzle and perhaps easier to comprehend. The fundamental con
cepts of religiosity, spirituality and philosophy are bypassed and impor
tant questions-why do people choose to be religious? why do many
Muslims born in the West choose to be practising Muslims?- are never
asked.
Is there something peculiar about the children of Muslim immigrants
that causes them, unlike other second-generation groups (Yang and
Ebaugh 2(01), to mimic their parents in a near robotic manner? Or are
these assumptions simply the outcome of limited grounded research?
Islamic revival in the West must be understood as more than the prod
uct of migration and culture clash (Huntington 1996), particularly when
its adherents are native-born. The assumption that second-generation
Muslims are foreign may be yet another (perhaps unintended) manifes
tation of the allegations of Muslim stagnation that characterize much
writing on Islam.Mamdani (2002) has noted: "Muslim culture is viewed
as petrified .... Muslims conform ... while others make culture.Mus
lims need to be rescued by the cultured." In point of fact, this character
ization of Islam reflects the bias of the beholder: it has no place in
scholarly work.
In an important article on immigrant religions in the United States,
Yang and Ebaugh (2001) present findings that resonate with the second
generation American-Muslim experience. They accurately observe that a
return to theological foundations (their term for a type of fundamentalism)
occurs among second generations because they must bridge differences
of culture and ethnic origin (internal pluralism) among co-religionists
and because the authority of a religion that is based simply on tradi
tion loses its power" (280). Second-generation Muslims are seen as
Americans and not foreigners and, like other religious groups, their
religious practices and institutions are viewed as dynamic. However,
while trying to fit Islam into their universal model of American immi
grant religions, Yang and Ebaugh ignore the global aspect of Islamic
revival Since the revival occurred first in the Islamic world, it cannot
have solely -local (American) explanation. Rather, it must be viewed in
the Ii�t of the intersecti� of local and global factors.
.
A slmilar� applies to Arab and South Asian Sunni Muslims
migrated to .. US between the turn of the twentieth century and
1980s:.their � secularism does not fit Herberg's
II

ISLAMIC REVIVAL AMONG SECOND-GENERATION ARAB-AMERICAN

103

(1960) classic thesis that new immigrants become more religious after
migration to the United States. As Hirschman (2003) notes, Herberg's
thesis is limited by ahistoricity and does not fit all immigrant communi
ties. The majority of Italian immigrants, for example, for reasons con
nected to religiosity in their country of origin and their sojourning
orientation, were not practicing Catholics in the early decades of the
twentieth century. High levels of religiosity among Irish immigrants in
the US during the same period are traced to a "Devotional Revolution"
in Ireland and the subsequent export of Irish clergy to the United States
(Larkin 1984). Hirschman's analysis points to the importance of examin
ing religiosity in an historical context, taking into account events in
immigrants' homelands and the context of their reception in the United
States.
Historically-grounded research can help to sort through these com
plex macro and micro processes, global and local variables and differ
ences between immigrant and second-generation religiosity. While

I

continue to unpack these processes through oral history research, this
paper lays out the contextual background for my exploration of Islamic
revival among second-generation Muslims in the US based upon histor
ical research in Chicago's Arab and Muslim communities. In a footnote
in his book,

Globalized Islam,

Olivier Roy states: "1 consider that it is

becoming increasingly irrelevant to study Islam in the West through the
prism of immigration" (2004,8). I agree. While the messengers of Islamic
revival may be global in origin-immigrants,transnational relationships
and mass communications-these conduits should not be viewed as
causal. Religiosity is an intensely personal experience that must, in the
end, be explained at the intersection of the individual, the local and the
global. When viewed from this perspective, African-American Islam (the
largest group of Muslims in the US) may not be an exceptional case that
has nothing in common with 'immigrant Islam.' On the contrary, the
study of African-American Islam offers insights into the relationship
between religion, the course of world history and the patterns of indi
vidual lives. Similarly, when examined in historical perspective, immi
grant Muslims and their children may share common experiences with
members of other religious groups in the United States.

Metropolitan Chicago as a research site
Metropolitan Chicago has one of the largest and most diverse Arab
communities in the United States. It is composed of some 100,000 per
sons/ of whom an estimated 70% are Muslims of va ryi ng economic sta

of nativity. Ac cor ding to Census 2000, Cook County
third-largest Arabic-speaking population by county in the US
and Chicago has the fifth-largest by place. More than half of the Arab

tuses and countries
has the

104

Louise Cainkar

TABLE 1. Arab immigrants intending to settle in Illinois by selected country of birth
and proportion of all Arab immigrants intending to settle in Illinois

. "---------------,----

"---- --------"-

1972

1980

1986

1995

2000

lord.nIP·lestine+

45%

36%

39%

31%

31%

33%

Iraq- (Includes Assyrians)

16%

35%

15%

26%

16%

25%

Egypt

15%

10%

12%

9%

6%

8%

Lebanon

10%

8%

11%

8%

5%

8%

Syria

6%

6%

9%

5%

10%

9%

2%

3%

4%

4%

4%

KuwaitA (Palestinians)

Cumulative

2%

Yemen
Thne countries as % of all

97%

97%

89%

83%

71%

89%

Arab immigranll to Illinois
SoIIrct: INS. Country of Birth data.
+

Ior""n lind Palestine lire combined because more titan 70% of Jordanian immigrants are of

Palestini,," origin. Chicago has the largest concentrated Palestinian community in tlte
CIIinkar J988.)

US. (Stt

•

Until tltt mid·1990s, tilt overwhelming majority of Iraqi immigrants were Assyrian Cltristians.
ChiCIJgo h4$ tltt lllrgtst Assyrian community in the US.
1\

Wt lI$,.�ume tlult most

or

all of the immigrants from Kuwait are Palestinian.

population of metropolitan Chicago is under the age of thirty and was
born in the United States. The largest Arab-Muslim communities in

Chicago are Palestinian and Egyptian, the former a lOO-year old com
munity, the latter a more recent arrival.
I have been conducting sociological research among Arab Muslims in
the Chicago metropolitan area for twenty-two years. Since the early
19905, I have observed a major transformation within this community,
characterized by the increasing importance of religiosity on individual
and institutional levels. On an individual level, religiosity is measured
by actions that engage religious practices-most notably, praying and
fasting-and actions that increase one's religious knowledge. Religios
ity is also a subjective state that includes holding core beliefs about faith
in God (spirituality) and perspectives on life issues informed by an
'slamic philosophy. Wearing a I;lijab (headscarf) is often an expression of
religiosity for Muslim women, although I believe that it is empirically
the case that women may wear a I;lijab and not be religious (that is, wear
:me for cultural reasons) or be religious and not wear a I;lijiib. On an
institutional level, religiosity is measured by the presence of religiOUS
institutions, as well as organizations that approach secular matters
[such as civil rights or domestic violence) from a religious perspective.
Corresponding to an increase in individual religiosity and religious
Lnstitution-buiJding, I have observed the decreasing influence of secu
ar, pan-Arab and nationalist organizations, values and perspectives.
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This is not to say that all Muslims became religious after 1990 or that
none were religious before 1990, but rather that the scales tipped signif
icantly from the secular to the religious during the 1990s.
This change is not explainable solely by migration, that is, by the pres
ence of new immigrants from Muslim countries. A significant propor
tion of the religiously-observant community is made up of the
American-born children of immigrants who came to the US in the 1960s,
1970s and 1980s. Many of these children have parents who are not them
selves observant and have voluntarily chosen to practice Islam. This
change is also not explainable solely by the influence of transnational
experiences. Preliminary data analysis shows that the majority of sec
ond-generation Muslims interviewed thus far in an ongoing study of the
Islamization of the Arab- (and South Asian-) Muslim community in
Chicago found Islam while fully embedded in their American lives. This
points to the importance of examining local experiences to understand
the appeal of Islam to American-born Muslims.
Indeed, the phenomenon of increasing religiosity among Arab Mus
lims in metropolitan Chicago is complex because migration and histori
cal change intersect to produce varying outcomes over time. Newer,
post-l990 Arab immigrants are more li k ely to be religiously-observant
than pre-1990 immigrants because of the decline of secularism and the
Islamic revival in their homelands. Second-generation Arab Americans
who reached adulthood in a more secular time may have quite different
experiences from those who did so in the 1990s, when religiosity was a
popular and viable option. Members of the latter group may even pre
cede their parents in the discovery of faith because of these historical cir
cumstances.
In this article, I wi I1 first examine the state of Islam among Arabs in
Chicago in the early 19805. Next, I will note some of the objective indi
cators of change in re ligi os ity among Arabs that began appearing in the
19905. Finally, I will examine some of the potential explanations for
changes among second-generation Arab Americans. I will assert that
Is la mic revival among American-born Arab Muslims is a process that is
proper ly explained only by consid ering the intersection of the global
and the local. Universal Islamic themes appeal to many Arab Americans
because the y p rovide answers to local experiences. This means that
Islamic revival in the US is not solely a foreign import, but also part of

the American experience rooted in a globaUy-connected world.
Chicago's Arab-Muslim communities

Arab-Muslim migration to Chicago commenced in the late 1800s. By the
early 1900s, Chicago was home to an Arab-Muslim community that was
predominantly Palestinian and largely male. (There was also a primarily
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Lebanese-Christian community of families.) When African Americans
migrated to Chicago from the southern United States, Palestinians began
a one-hundred-year economic relationship with their community, most
often as traders, peddlers and shopkeepers. (The current economic rela
tionship between these two communities is not without controversy,
which is related to the Arab concentration in small grocery and liquor
stores in African-American neighbourhoods.) Palestinian traders and
shopkeepers lived in the African-American communities in which they
worked, often at the back of their shops, or on their edges in boarding
houses, until after World War II, when Palestinian family migration
began. The Palestinian immigrants then moved to all-white neighbour
hoods on Chicago's southwest side that bordered the so-called Black
Belt. Middle-class Palestinians continued to move in a southwest trajec
tory from these 'buffer areas' in the 1970s. In step with their ethnic
European neighbours, who were fleeing neighbourhood decline and
African-American expansion, middle-class Arabs moved to neighbour
ing all-white suburbs. This movement persisted throughout the 1980s
and 1990s, and began to include Palestinians of all income levels. Al
though a core community of new immigrants and low- and middle
income families remains on the southwest side of the city, the weight of
the community has shifted to the suburbs, including new immigrants
and some low-income families. A more recent migration of Yemenis has
settled, like the Palestinians, on the south side and in the southwest sub
urbs. Large numbers of Palestinian and Jordanian Christians have also
migrated to Chicago, although their migration started later than the Mus
lims and they are as likely to live on the north side of the city as the south.
Arab Muslims from Iraq, Lebanon and Syria and Egyptian Muslims
and Christians began migrating to Chicago in the 1950s, initially as stu
dents in most cases. After 1%5, the size of these groups increased, espe
cially as visas became available for skilled professionals and their
famili�, but their numbers have never approached those of the large
Palestinian community in Chicago. At least one out of every three Arab
immigrants intending to settle in Illinois since 1965 has been Palestinian
(see Table 1). Their actual proportion as a percentage of Arabs in Illinois
is much higher than this because a large number of the migrants from
Iraq are Assyrians and not Arabs. Although Illinois has an historic
Lebanese community, it is one of the few states in which persons of
Lebanese and Syrian ancestry are outnumbered by other Arabs (Arab
American Institute 2000).
Unlike Palestinian Muslims and Yemenis, who are concentrated on
the southwest side and in the southwest suburbs (but also live elsewhere
in the metropolitan area), other Arab groups are dispersed across the
north side of Chicago and in the north, northwest and western suburbs
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of the city. In the 1990s, some two thousand Iraqi refugees were settled
on the north side. Because of their location, because most were Shica
Muslims (and of low socio-economic status) and, possibly, because of
the unique political circumstances between Iraq and the US, their inter
action with other Arabs in Chicago (including earlier migrating Iraqis)
has been limited.

The practice of Islam

among Arab Muslims in the early 19808
In the early 1980s, when I conducted my first ethnographic study of the
city's Arab community, there were some 20,000 Palestinians living in
metropolitan Chicago. Thousands were Christian, but the majority were
Muslim and lived on the southwest side of the city, even though the
movement of the middle class to the southwest suburbs had already
begun. The Palestinian Muslims were by far the largest Arab group in
metropolitan Chicago. Field notes and interviews taken from research
that I conducted between 1982 and 1985 provide rich empirical data on
the practice of Islam early in the decade.
During this time, Islam was, at best, a way of life for Chicago's Pales
tinian Muslims. In fact, most of the second-generation (American-born)
Palestinian-Muslim women whom I interviewed said that they knew
more about Christianity than Islam. Few of the immigrant Palestinian
Muslim women acknowledged practicing their faith beyond fasting dur
ing Ramadan and occasionally reading the Qur'an. Islamic dress was
uncommon and the jilbiib (ankle-length, loose-fitting coat) was never
seen in public. Wearing the �ijab was largely limited to newly-arrived,
married, peasant women who had less than a high sch ool education and
the small number of Palestinian women who had previ ously lived in the
countries of the Gulf. The former were viewed not as religious women
invoking modesty, but as representatives of a traditional Palestinian
peasantry, whose way of life and cultural symbols (such as embroidered
dresses) Palestinian nationalism was fighting to preserve.
Despite a long-standing commercial relationship between Arab Mus
lims (as sellers) and African Americans (as buyers), there were limited
spiritual and congregational relationships between Arab and African
American Muslims. Although some immigrant Palestinians taught Ara
bic at Chicago's Nation of Islam (NOI) institutions, recorded history
notes that differences between the Sunni Islam of the immigrants and
the Black nationalism of the NOI made shared religious congregations
difficult (Curtis 2002). The religious life of Arab Muslims in Chicago was
not, therefore, a product of fusion with African-American Islam.
In my original study, I asked immigrant and American-born I'alestiJUan..
Muslim women between the ages of 18 and 40 whether religion was
important in their lives, why it was or was not, and to provide relevant
-
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examples taken from their day-to-day experiences. More than eighty
percent of both groups said that Islam was important in their lives. In
response to why and how it was important, they described Islam in
terms of its values and prohibitions. They did not, however, describe it
as a spiritual force in their lives or as a source of strength and guidance.
Islam was about family cohesion, respect for elders, modesty, chastity,
being a good person and fasting during Ramadan; it was against alco
hol, drugs and pre-marital sex. Muslim holidays were celebrated, but
they generally lacked deep spiritual content. Few of my informants
engaged in interventive religious practices-seeking access to God by
praying, whether routinely or occasionally.
Answers to my questions about the importance of religion in their
lives and how it manifested itself are indicative of this state. Normative
responses included:

My religion says to me not to drink, not have boyfriends and girlfriends,
to respect your brothers and family, to listen to them, and to thank God
for everything.
Our religion says that we should stay together, work together, that we
should do everything together.
Our religion is Muslim and it is very important to me. We read the
Qur'an and my father tells us things. We have to pray and fast, but I
don't pray, just the fasting.
Yes, [Muslim] holidays I celebrate. My husband doesn't care so much
because he's been here SO long and just got busy. I don't fast now.. ..I don t
pray so much now, because I have baby and I have to be dean to pray.
'

I

don't follow it very strictly although I do adhere to the basic principles.

Q: Do you practice it formally? A: Do you mean praying five times a
day? No, I don't. But I do fast and refrain from alcohol and drugs. I try
to be good sometimes, most of the time.
There are things I cannot do because of my religion. I could not go to the
beach here and not cover up. Yes, I do fast.
It is my background, but I don't pray five times a day. My parents were
not religious. Not where they practiced it daily. My mother knows the
verses of the Qur'an, but does not go to the mosque. It has been prac
ticed from within in Our daily lives; this is our religion.
Indeed, these responses show that 'Muslim' was moving toward
becoming a cultural identity because Islam's spiritual core was missing.

ISLAMIC REVIVAL AMONG SECOND-GENERATION ARAB-AMERICAN

109

This cultural identity was not necessarily a conscious rejection of reli
gion; more accurately, it was the option available and the way of life
prevalent at the time. Those who clearly chose to be cultural Muslims
answered questions about religion much like the following woman:
am a Muslim only in the sense that it identifies me and is inbred in me,
do not practice. My husband is Muslim, too. My family was never that
religiously-oriented, never fasted.
I
I

The reasons for this state of religiosity in the early and mid-1980s
were embedded in contemporaneous socio-political conditions in the
United States, Palestine and Jordan. In the US, these Muslim women
were part of a religious minority in a Christian-majority society. In met
ropolitan Chicago, in particular, they had no established religious insti
tutions. There was no viable mosque (see below) nor were there
avenues for formal religious instruction or spiritual development. In the
early to mid-1980s, the Palestinian Muslim community had two reli
gious leaders who could officiate at Muslim marriages and lead
prayers, but both of these men had other occupations. One worked in
sales and the other was a real estate agent. There were quite a few com
munity institutions, however. These embraced the ideals of secular
nationalism and pan-Arabism, and included Christians, Muslims and
Jews who shared the same aspirations for Palestinian statehood, human
rights, democracy and justice-as well as the fall of Arab regimes com
promising these objectives.
Because Chicago lacked appropriate religious institutions, the Mus
lim education of the second generation was composed almost solely of
what their parents had taught them. It was often the case that parents
worked long hours and had little time and energy to transmit religiOUS
knowledge. It was most efficient to pass on values and prohibitions
about family, modesty, generosity, chastity, diet, intoxicants, sexuality,
fasting and holidays. The following responses to the question, "where
did you learn about your religion?," give a sense of the religious instruc
tion characteristic of this period.
Basically, what my parents told me and I read some about it, but noth
ing formal.
We read the Qur)an and my fa ther

tens us things.

I am a Muslim, but in name only. I believe in God, but do not participate.
Because we never had a mosque to go to and my parents worked and
did not have time to teach us the
becoming more interested.

Qur'an verses. But I think now 1 am
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I never went to a mosque, I don't think. When I was younger we never
went to a mosque because there weren't any. I always thought my religion
was really very, very different from everybody else's. I know more about
Christianity than my own religion, being raised in this country. Every time

we saw on TV The Ten Commandments, Jesus ofNazareth, or something like
that, my parents would tell us to sit down and tell us how it is different.

While fasting during the month of Ramadan was considered impor
tant and observed by many, praying was uncommon, whether by immi
grant parents or immigrant or American-born children. Indeed, most of
the latter did not know how to perform $alii (prayers). One woman spoke
about going to Palestine for a visit when a young adult and being pitied
by her relatives for not knowing how to pray.
Even the concept of women covering their hair as a religious practice
was not mentioned by interviewees in relation to discussions of Islam,
and the number of second-generation Arab-American Muslim women
who wore the

bijab was negligible.

But foregoing the

f:zijiib was not neces

sarily about being in America. Only the women mentioned above, who
wore traditional embroidered dresses and the flowing, white, sheer scarf
of the Palestinian peasant, wore the f:zijiib; urban women and the large
corps of young, adult, Palestinian women with high-school and college
educations emigrating from Palestine and Jordan did not. Indeed, newly
immigrating young women who wore the f:zijiib were expected to take it
off in the United States or risk being considered

mutakhallif (backward).

At that time, this act did not evoke as much conflict as might be expected
from the perspective of today, nor did it provoke substantial parental dis
approval. Wearing the bijab had become increasingly uncommon in much
of Palestine and Jordan. The 'modem Muslim woman' was not

mul;rajjaba.

Consider these conversations with Palestinian-Muslim women:
My mother does not wear traditional clothes. When she was young she

20 years.
Q: Does you mother wear a veil or anything like that? A: No.

wore them for

Q: If you were still back home in Palestine, do you think you would be
the same way? A: Yes.

Q: Do you fast? A: No. My parents are very strict Muslims, but we did
not keep up with them. I used to tell my father there are many women
who cover their heads and faces and are not nice, and you should be
thankful that I do not do those things.
If I say I am Arabian, people are surprised. Some met me and asked

where is my veil? Now it is n ot that way. Some women do wear the veil

still, but not all of them.
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Only among the minority of Palestinian women, those arriving from
Arab Gulf countries, where the �ijab was still commonly worn, did one
hear of anguished experiences when women were asked by others to
remove their headscarves.
The state of religious knowledge and practice described above was
not merely the result of being in the United States. Modernity, foreign
occupation, Westernization, secularism, communism and nationalism
each played a role in marginalizing religious rituals and practices in
much of the post-colonial Islamic world. So when Palestinian, Egyptian,
Iraqi, Lebanese and Syrian Muslims migrated to the US in the 1980s or
before, many had already cast aside a number of religious practices. The
everyday experience of being a Muslim in the United States was, of
course, different from being a Muslim in a Muslim country, but the
range and degree of difference between the two geographic spaces was
not as great as might be expected given the wide institutional and cul
tural disparities. Moreover, Islam reduced of its rituals and practices
rendered adjustment to American society and culture easier than it
might otherwise have been-although this was not the primary reason
for the secularism of immigrants and their children. Life in the US was
challenging and negative stereotypes of Arabs were abundant. Immi
grant and second-generation Arabs of all religious faiths drew strength
and pride from ideas based upon nationalism, pan-Arabism and the his
toric magnificence and resilience of their culture; they also maintained
deep, transnational relationships. But, in time, these organizing ideolo
gies lost meaning in the Arab community, beaten into submission
worldwide by the outcomes of the 1990-91 Gulf War, the first Palestin
ian intifiiqa and the failed peace process. Islam emerged as an option for
filling the moral and spiritual vacuum created by their absence. While
an Islam reduced of its spirituality was no aid in coping with the chal
lenging aspects of American society, a vibrant Islam could be a real
asset.

Institution-building
The Muslim population of Chicago grew larger and more diverse in the
1970s and 1980s, mainly due to migration enabled by cha ng es in US
immigration law. Emigrants from Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria,
India and Pakistan, as well as smaller numbers from Iran, Turkey,
Yemen, Afghanistan and Morocco, and a continuing stream of Palestini
ans made metropolitan Chic ago their home. In the late 19705, pan-ethnic
communal celebrations of major Islamic holidays began to be held in
large public forums, such as McCormick Place. Then came institution

building. As noted above, the Palestinian-Muslim community was the
largest immigrant-origin Arab-Muslim community in Chicago and
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developed a residential concentration on the southwest side of the city
and in its southwest suburbs. In 1981, they completed construction of a
mosque in the southwest suburb of Bridgeview after more than twenty
years of fundraising spearheaded by the Palestinian Ladies Society.
Unable to complete construction without external funders, community
leaders turned to wealthy donors in the oil-rich Gulf States for charita
ble support. According to the Chicago

Tribune (Ahmed-Ullah et al. 2004),

they received more than $350,000 from donors in Kuwait, $152,000 from
the Saudi government, and $135,000 from the government of the United
Arab Emirates. Donations from wealthy Arabs or their governments to
Arab institutions with fewer resources were common before the Gulf
War. This sort of support, for example, allowed secular institutions like
Palestine's Bir Zeit University and AI-Maqasid Hospital to pay salaries
and remain open.
The Bridgeview mosque was initially a place where men prayed on
Fridays, women held meetings on Saturdays and weekday evenings, and
children learned Arabic on Sundays. But when a full-time, religiously

trained imam was brought from Egypt to provide religious leadership for
the mosque, major changes started to occur. The

imlim put spiritual and

ritual substance into the practice of Islam. While no one was forced to be
religious, those who chose to be were taught to adhere carefully to the
Qur'an and traditions of the Prophet. This required, in turn, modifica
tions in the behaviour of the faithful, provoking change in the overall
comfort level and in accommodation with the normative practices of
American society. The isolation of Chicago's Muslim community was
over as it was now linked with the global world of Islam-and that world
was on the verge of a transformation. The transnational links of earlier
migrants had not been enough to give substance to Islam because these
migrants had come at a time when Islamic practice was weak and
because most had adopted the prevalent community ethos that living in
the United States required accommodations to dominant Christian and
secularized society.
It would seem normal and natural that persons practicing a religion
should be asked by religious leaders at a religious institution to respect
and apply the teachings of their religion in their daily lives. But when,
imlim required women to wear headscarves in all

for example, the new

parts of the mosque, he provoked conflict with women community lead
ers (who had raised the funds for the mosque), who were not in the habit
of covering their hair. (It is interesting to note that the practice of selling

a large propertion of the mosque s male
a large percentage of families, did not
become the object of religious dispute.) A battle over who controlled the
mosque was eventually launched between Muslims who so ught to
alcohol, an occupation held by

congregation and supporting

'
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practice Islam as they had in the past and Muslims who sought stricter
religious purity. The dispute ended in a court case. The Circuit Court of
Cook County decided in 1983 that the mosque's board of directors and
the North American Islamic Trust, which now held title to the mosque,
had corporate control over it. In 1985, the mosque's board brought a new
imam to the mosque. Still the imam in 2005, Sheikh Jamal is a Palestinian
trained in Islamic studies at a Saudi university who initially came to the
US to teach Arabic to African-American Muslims.
In the 1990s, the practice of Islam among Chicago's Muslims surged
quantitatively and qualitatively, although wide variations continued to
exist within the community. The number of Muslims attending Friday
prayers at the Bridgeview mosque increased from about 75 in 1982 to
more than 800 in 1993 {to nearly 2000 today).4 This increase has not been
due to migration alone: local experiences and global developments have
contributed to a rise in religiosity. By the 1990s, newly-arriving Arab
Muslim immigrants had experienced Islamic revival in their homelands
and a larger proportion of new immigrants was spiritually and ritually
committed to Islam than in prior times. Some earlier immigrants experi
enced a change in the meaning of religion in their lives upon return vis
its to their homelands. Increasingly, the American-born children of Arab
immigrants found spiritual depth and meaning in the practice of
Islam-many of them despite what they saw as their parents' compro
mised form of religious living. In addition, there were now a few Islamic
schools to which more affluent parents could send their children for an
education embraced by Islamic teachings. For these American Muslims,
the universal values of Islam and the strength of their religiosity helped
them to cope with their particular local experiences as homogenized,
dehumanized and voiceless Arabs in America (Ahmed-Ullah et al. 20(4).
In earlier times, these spiritual needs had been met by the hope, dignity
and vision offered by nationalist institutions, but most of these institu
tions were devastated after the 1990-91 Gulf War.5

Objective indicators of the change
Objective indicators of these changes in religiosity among Arab Muslims
in Chicago are numerous. They were evident in the mid-l990s and have
become dominant since the turn of the twenty-first century. Within the
large Palestinian community, some village-based societies still hold occa
sional functions, however, all but one of the Palestinian community cen
tres have closed and mosques have taken their place as venues for social
activities, political discussions, lectures and community services. l;lalitl
meat markets and Islamic clothing stores have opened across metropoli
tan Chicago. A change in values has also become evident at the institu
tional level. For example, excluding Christian and private gatherings,
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liquor is no longer served at public events sponsored by Arab secular
institutions. A dramatic play of these values was evident at the Arab
American Institute's 1996 Democratic National Convention Gala in
Chicago where, at the insistence of local donors, only coffee, tea and soft
drinks were served at its late-night (10 pm-l am) party for political lead
ers and candidates.
Arab student organizations at local universities have become weak or
ceased operation, while Muslim student organizations, especially the
Muslim Students Association (MSA), have begun to flourish. Islamic pro
fessional associations and social service agencies have increased in num
ber and in activities. Similarly, there is growing demand for social
workers with an Islamic perspective at mainstream agencies. At the
national level, Islamic civic institutions, such as the Council on American
Islamic Relations, have begun organizing and engaging in advocacy and
mainstream political participation. After the 11 September 2001 attacks on
the US, these activities grew further and expanded at the local level as
Muslims realized the importance of decreasing their institutional and
social isolation. Their links with mainstream civil society institutions
were deepened as they developed partnerships to forestall further attacks
on Muslim civil rights (Cainkar 2004a; 2004b).
I have personally observed hundreds of individuals change from sec
ular to religious since the mid-1990s, while conducting research and par
ticipating in the Arab and Muslim communities. Immigrant and
American-born women who had never before covered their hair have
adopted the �I;jab-once unusual, but now a common sight in the metro
politan Chicago area. These dramatic changes in the meaning, practice,
politics and institution-building of Islam within Chicago's Arab-Muslim
community have been mirrored nationwide (Haddad and Esposito
1998). Something deeply sociological and critically important to Ameri
can society has occurred.
Immigration alone cannot explain this dramatic revival of religiosity
in the course of the Arab-American community's l00-year history in
Chicago. According to Census 2000, while 48% of persons of Arab ances
try in the Chicago Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area are foreign
born, just about 25% entered the United States after 1990. In addition, a
large proportion of these post-l990 immigrants are Iraqi Shi{a Muslims
who came to the US as post-Gulf War refugees and who are not part of
the Islamicization trend of Sunni Muslims described here (Cainkar
1999b). This revival also cannot be explained solely as an outcome of
transnational familyrelationships or overseas travel, although th ese, too,
playa role. Nor can it be explained by the increased migration of South
Asians. Bosnians, or other Muslims, because contact between these c0m
munities and Arab Americans has been infrequent, although increasing.
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Neither migration nor pan-Islamic contacts, institution-building nor
parental upbringing fully explains why young Muslim adults (ages
18-30) born and raised in the US chose to find comfort, spiritual growth
and existential meaning in religiosity. It is more correct to understand the
Islamic revival occurring among Arab Americans as an outcome of the
increasing interconnectedness of the world intersecting with the spirits,
imaginations and challenges of persons who lead very local lives. A
growing number of Arab-American Muslims are finding ways to under
stand the perplexing questions of their locally-situated experiences
through Islam. Their knowledge of Islamic philosophies and rituals has
been allowed to deepen and flourish through access to books, religious
leaders, Islamic institutions and organizations in the US, as well as a global
pool of internet sites, list-servs and satellite TV stations; and through inter
national travel and relationships with other Muslims, only some of whom
are immigrants. As Islamic revival has surged in strength and momen
tum globally, the Islam of the East is now more strongly interwoven with
the Islam of the West. In the diasporic Muslim communities of the West,
Islam is being catalyzed not by the pilgrims, scholars, conquerors and
missionaries who led the early global expansion of the faith, but by the
experiences of the descendants of refugees, exiles and former slaves, by
global technology and by the quest for dignity brought about by racism
and inequality. Knowledge of Islam and its institutional growth is dialec
tically related to contestations faced by Muslims. As Islam and Muslims
face more challenges, Islamic revival grows (Cainkar forthcoming).

Challenges to religious institutions
With the rise in religiosity among Arab Muslims in OUcago, community
members have sought to build new religious institutions

to meet their

congregational needs. Their efforts in the southwest suburbs, site of the
largest concentration of Arabs in metropolitan Chicago, have met with
significant opposition. In 2000, an attempt by Arab Muslims to purchase
an abandoned building in suburban Palos Heights for conversion into a
mosque was halted due to public protest. The city counci1 voted to pay the

AI Salaam Mosque Foundation $200,000 to back out of its contract with
the vendors of the property, but the compensation plan was vetoed by an
embarrassed mayor (Martin 2000) . The Muslims filed a discrimination
lawsuit, which they lost in 2005. In 2004, another group of soutwest
suburban Arab Muslims sought to build a mosque in an unincorporated
area near Orland Park. Opposition raged and the Orland Park city coun
cil (which sought to annex the land) was forced to hold three public hear
ings on the matter.
The issues raised by most opponents to the mosque had little to do
with Orland Park; they were global. Opponents invoked the war in Iraq,
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international terrorism, the purported violent essence of Islam and
homeland security. The following abbreviated quotes provide a sense of
these discourses.
We care about America. We care about what's going on because we
don't want you to bring it here. We're not saying that you'll bring it, but
you must understand that because you're tied in with this religion and
a possible mosque in Orland Park, it will come to our doorstep.
Can you give a guarantee to me that these Muslims and their mosque
are not going to be terrorists?

A Baptist minister made the following statement:
Now, as a Christian, a Baptist and an American, I'm a firm believer in reli
gious liberty and favour any religious group buying property or erecting
a house of worship-but liberty has limits! No group that jeopardizes our

personal safety or our national security is deserving of our tolerance. I
think, at this point, it would be helpful, fair and important to make a dis
tinction between radical Muslims and moderate Muslims. The radical

Muslim terrorists kill people every day. Moderate Muslims do not kill
peop le Moderate Muslims supply the cash to the militant Muslims.
.

In September

2004,

Cook County Clerk David Orr withdrew the

polling license of the Baptist minister's church, citing the offensive and
undemocratic character of his public statements as a member of the
mosque opposition.
An Arab-American doctor spoke of his treatment of neighbourhood
children in the hospital emergency room and his solid membership in
the local community. He asked rhetorically: "What have these Muslims
done to you?" The audience shouted:

"9/11!" Another Arab American

spoke of growing up in the southwest suburbs, changing his name to
Nick and aSSimilating into American society. He declared that, after the
rancour expressed during the hearings, he was changing his name back
to Ibrahim. Surely, this experience will evolve into more than a symbolic
name change for Nick. Like many others before him, Nick will be pro
pelled by discrimination and malice into one of two choices: living in a
state of alienation from mainstream, white SOCiety or building his self
esteem, pride and dignity through Islam. The presence of other Mus
lims, Muslim institutions, Muslim websites and Muslim list-servs will

growth, knowledge and faith. But his discovery of
outcome of his American experience.
The 2004 Orland Park mosque battle points to a number of important
post-9jII paradoxes. The mosque dispute w as settled when the Orland
nurture his spiritual

religion will be an
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Park city council voted unanimously t o annex the land slated for the
mosque, thereby approving the mosque's construction permit. Each city
council member invoked his or her duty to support the US constitution
and the guaranteed right to freedom of religion. The mayor of Orland
Park had previously sent letters to all town residents stating his support
for the mosque. Contrast these outcomes with the earlier mosque dis
pute in 2000, when Muslims were openly rebuffed by elected officials
and then pressured to back down on their lawsuit. In the post-9j11 con
text, at the same time as they experienced organized opposition and ver
bal backlash, Muslims showed greater local power and evoked greater
local respect than they had only a few years before (even though the two
communities are adjacent and demographically similar). Finally, as pre
liminary data from my post-9/11 impact study show, increasing hostil
ity and discrimination against Muslims are behind continuing rises in
religiosity among (formerly) secular Muslims.

Conclusion: The dialectic has unfolded
Scholars have focused upon explaining the Islamic revival occurring in
the West as an outcome of immigration, transnational ties, foreign money
and events occurring within the Islamic world. That is, Islamic revival
has been viewed as something foreign, allowing an easy leap to the con
clusion that it is, therefore, anti-Western and threatening. This study
shows that experiences particular to the United States play an important
role in American Islamic revival. Much of Islam's appeal is due to its res
onance to daily life events occurring in the United States and its capacity
to offer meaning and build resilience: consider Hirschman (2003, 26) and
Partes's concept of "refuge, respectability, and resources." American
born Arabs, who are neither foreigners nor anti-Western, are increasingly
choosing to be Muslim in practice and in name, irrespective of their par
ents' religiosity or lack thereof. They find strength in the spirituality of
Islam and hope in its message of justice and equality. In this regard , the
revival of Islam among American Muslims is not unlike historic African
American experiences with Islam. As with African Americans, Arab
Americans and immigrant Muslims experience negative and stereotypic
representations in mainstream society, discrimina tion, dehumanization,
political exclusion and voicelessness. Their youth experience alienation in
the schools and have to combat self-hatred imbued by textbooks, Hal
loween costumes, video games, talk shows and movies that portray them
as barbaric. Although not at the same levels as the African-American
experience, these conditions are similar to those out of which Noble Drew
Ali, Elijah Mohamed, Malcolm X and Wallace D. Mohammed offered a
message of hope and dignity to African Americans through Islam. This is
not simply Islam by heredity, force, or foreign invasion.
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African-American Islam was contested in an earlier era-by Muslim
immigrants for its authenticity, by members of the civil rights movement
for its separatism and by the US government because of its effectiveness
in organizing African-American opposition to structural racism. Now,
however, conflicts with Islam are framed in global terms. When Catholics
and Jews migrated in large numbers to the United States, the religious
conflicts that they faced were largely seen as domestic concerns. Today,
however, the US is a global superpower and American Muslims face
challenges of a different sort. Muslims have been represented as enemies
of the West, in which case they must be seen as foreigners and Islam as
an alien religion. But the embrace of Islam by a significant number of sec
ond-generation Arabs (as well as South Asians, Eastern Europeans and
Africans) will have, in time, a major impact on the mutual accommoda
tions of American society and Muslims. Because their upbringing and
Islamicization are largely American experiences, they are more able than
their immigrant parents to cross barriers of culture, race and ethnicity
and to forge pan-Islamic relationships. Their knowledge of American
methods of organizing will increase Muslim civic and political integra
tion in American society. They will begin to influence events occurring in
the broader Islamic world. The complex dialectic between Islam and the
West will continue to unfold as Islam becomes institutionally and
socially acknowledged as an American religion.

NOTES
1 An interesting discussion of these and other terms is found in Sadiq Al Azm's
Isillmic fundlimentQlism Reconsidered.
2 The research on Islamic revival in the United States is funded by a Carnegie Cor
poration Scholar Award.
1 This number is an estimate and excludes Assyrians, whose origins are in Iraq or

Iran. These numbers do not match census data. See Cainkar (forthcoming 2(05) for a
qualitative assessment of the accuracy of Census 2000 data.
4 According to ongoing data collection in a study of second-generation Arab- and
South Asian-Muslims in metropolitan Chicago.
� I discuss these changes in more detail in Cainkar 1999a . One outcome of the Gull
War was the expulsion of Palestinians from Gulf countries, including Kuwait. This
act seriously depleted secular nationalist financial resources.
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